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Constitutions and Revolutions: The Impact
of Unification and the Constitutions of the
Five New German States on the
Amendment of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany
CHRISTOPH J. PARTSCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The changes in the foreign and domestic politics of Germany caused
by unification have been and will continue to be reflected in the changes
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic, also known as the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz).' The constitutions 2 and draft constitutions' of the five
new states of the Federal Republic of Germany reveal the direction that
the future Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany will take.
They also reflect the difficult history of two dictatorships and the
problems of a society in transformation towards democracy. The
Einigungsvertrag, the "Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic on the Achievement of the Unity
of Germany,"" changed the present constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany and recommended amendments to the Basic Law.' Most of
the prior changes to the Basic Law resulted from negotiations with the
* The author was legal advisor to the committee "Constitution and Law" and to vari-
ous other committees in the Parliaments of Saxony, Dresden, Federal Republic of Germany
in 1991. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. He would like
to express his gratitude to Mrs. Swetlana von Bismarck for her contributions to this article.
1. Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland of May 23, 1949 [hereinafter Basic
Law] [GGI 1949 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBt] I 1 (F.R.G.), translated in ELMAR M. HUCKO,
THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, FOUR GERMAN CONSTITUTIONS 194-265 (1987).
2. Constitution of the State of Brandenburg, as adopted by plebiscite on June 14, 1992,
6 Gesetz-und Verordnungsblatt [GVB1] Brandenburg 121 (1992), to enter into force on Aug.
21, 1992, Landesverfassung kann in Kraft treten, DER TAGESSPIEGEL, Aug. 13, 1992 at 6;
Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, as adopted by parliament on May 26, 1992, Drs. 1/
1800, Sachsischer Landtag beschlieszt Verfassung, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
[F.A.Z.] May 27, 1992 at 1; Constitution of the State of Sachsen-Anhalt, as adopted by
parliament on July 16, 1992, 31 GVBI Sachsen-Anhalt 600 (1992).
3. Draft Constitution of the State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern of Apr. 30, 1992, Drs.
1/20000; Draft Constitution of the State of Thuringia of Apr. 10, 1991, Drs. 1/285.
4. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratis-
chen Republik t0ber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Einigungsvertrag) [Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
Achievement of the Unity of Germany], Aug. 31, 1990, BGB1 II 885; Gesetzblatt [GBI]
G.D.R. 1, 1627; Verfassungsgesetz [Verf.] art. 4., translated in 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991) [herein-
after Treaty of the Unity of Germany].
5. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 4.
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four former Allied powers, illustrated by the Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany.6 The present recommendations will af-
fect the internal constitutional structure of the present united Germany.
The five states of the former German Democratic Republic entered
into extensive parliamentary and public debates on the shape of their fu-
ture state constitutions even before discussions of reunification began.7
Due to their different political orientation, the constitutions and draft
constitutions of these new states offer an intriguing spectrum of modern
constitutional thinking in Germany. As a result, they will have considera-
ble influence on the amendments to the Basic Law, which will shape the
reunited Federal Republic of Germany as a part of the European
Community.
6. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, F.D.R.-G.D.R.-U.K.-U.S.,
1990 BGBI II 1318, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1188 (1990) [hereinafter Treaty on Final
Settlement]:
Article 1
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its exter-
nal borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date the present
treaty comes into force....
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing
border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law.
(3) The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other
states and shall not assert any in the future.
(4) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic shall ensure that the constitution of the united Germany
does not contain any provision incompatible with these principles. This applies
accordingly to the provisions laid down in the preamble, the second sentence of
Article 23, and Article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany.
(5) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America take formal note of the corresponding commitments
and declarations by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic and declare that their implementation will
confirm the definitive nature of the united Germany's borders.
Article 2
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic reaffirm their declarations . . According to the constitution of
the united Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb
the peaceful relations between nations. . . are unconstitutional and a punisha-
ble offence. The Governments. . . declare that the united Germany will never
employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the
Charter of the United Nations.
7. The committee to change the constitution, Verfassungskommission, started working
on January 16, 1992 and according to an agreement between the parties is supposed to
finish its work by March 31, 1992. Scholz und Voscherau Vorsitzende der Verfassungskom-
mission, F.A.Z., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
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I. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Before 1871, the multitude of independent kingdoms, duchies, coun-
ties, and free cities that later formed Germany were unable to unite as a
nation due to their strategic position in the center of Europe. Reluctant
to abandon their statehood completely, these states preserved many of
their former rights in the Constitution of the German Empire, which left
the inclusion of a bill of rights to the state constitutions. s
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the newly declared
democratic republic, the Republic of Weimar,' adopted a Constitution in
1919 that again reduced the power of the states, though they still retained
considerable control.'0 A bill of rights was added, 1 but the rights were
subjective' 2 and could not be vindicated by any court and could be lim-
ited by ordinary legislation. As a result, this constitution proved to be
ineffective' s to withstand the burden of an economy crippled by the four
victorious powers -of World War I in the Versailles Treaty, a worldwide
depression, and the advance of political extremism by the Communists on
the one side and the National Socialists on the other."' One of the first
victims of Germany's move toward autocratic centralization was the state
of Prussia.'6 After gaining power in 1933, Hitler's National Socialists cen-
tralized the country and immediately abolished the states.'
8. HucKo, supra note 1, at 36, 121. For a detailed description, see GORDON A. CRAIG,
GERMANY 1866 - 1945, at 38-41 (1980). Most notably, foreign policy and defense were as-
signed to the Reich.
9. Weimar, the city of the writer Johann Wolfang von Goethe, is a small town in
Thuringen where the members of the National Assembly gathered in order to avoid the
post-war turmoil of Berlin while writing the new constitution.
10. Constitution of the Weimarer Republic, arts. 5 and 12, translated in HUCKO, supra
note 1, at 149, 152; CRAIG, supra note 8, at 419; ERICH ROPER, Verfassunggebung und
Verfassungskontinuitat in den ostlichen Bundeslindern 149, 152 (1991).
11. Gerhard Anschuetz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11, August 1919,
14 KOMMENTAR 507 (1933, reprinted 1965): arts. 109-165("Grundrechte und Grundp-
flichten") [fundamental rights and duties].
12. Id. at 506.
13. HUCKO, supra note 1, at 60.
14. HANS SCHNEIDER, HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[Handbook of the Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany] (Josef Isensee
and Paul Kirchhoff eds.) § 3(D), at 136. In the April, 1932 presidential elections 19.4 million
votes were cast for Hindenburg, backed by democratic parties; 13.4 million for Adolf Hitler;
and 3.7 million for Ernst Thilrann, the communist leader. The 5th Reichstag (Sept. 14,
1930) comprised of 577 parlamentarians, including 107 Nazis and 77 Communists; the 6th
Reichstag (July 31, 1932) comprised of 608 parlamentarians, including 230 Nazis and 89
Comunists; and the 7th Reichstag (Nov. 6, 1932) comprised of 584 parlamentarians, and
included 196 Nazis and 100 Communists. Id. at 138.
15. On July 20, 1932, following bloody brawls between Nazis and Communists, the
Chancellor of the Reich, Franz von Papen, deposed the Prussian Government and became
it" i 'ich Commissioner. CRAIG, supra note 8, at 561.
16. On 'pril 7, 1934, Vorldiufiges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Ltinder, the "Prelimi-
nary Law to Coordinate the Lnder" was passed, appointing commissioners for all Ldnder,
and the Gesetz iiber den Neuaufbau des Reiches, January 30, 1934 [RGB1] I, 75, HERMANN
KINDER, WERNER HILGEMANN, LAW TO RESTRUCTURE THE REICH 195. The bad results for the
1992
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After World War II, the Allied powers wished to "de-nazify" and to
democratize Germany, as well as to remove it as a strong power from the
European theater. The Allies decentralized Germany again and restored
federalism either by restoring old states1 7 or by creating new ones."8 Ten
states, Liinder,"9 were eventually established in the west to form the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, with the Basic Law of May 23rd 1949, the
Grundgesetz, as its constitutional basis.20
In the Soviet-controlled East, five states were created:2 Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern2 2 in the North, Saxony in the South-East, Thuringia
in the South-West, Sachsen-Anhalt in the West, and Brandenburg in the
area surrounding Berlin.23 The Soviet Union forced the East German
puppet regime to abandon the newly established states and the rather
liberal Constitution of 1949, which was proven to be ineffective in consti-
tutional reality, and to return to centralism. 24 Following the reform move-
ment and the growing dissent in the Communist countries - best repre-
sented by the mass exodus of East Germans via Hungary and Austria,2 5
the demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin,2 and by the opening
of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 198927 - East German leaders reluc-
tantly yielded to public pressure and prepared accession to the Federal
Nazis in the last election on March 5, 1933 prompted this decision because despite consider-
able harassment, communists and democratic parties obtained 81 and 268 votes as opposed
to 288 for nazi parlamentarians. Id. at 576.
17. Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, and Baden were restored.
18. Hessen, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), and Nordrhein-Westfahlen were created.
19. ROPER, supra note 10, at 153; their number was reduced to nine with the formation
of Baden-W(irttemberg out of two states and increased again to ten when the Saarland
joined the F.R.G. in 1957. Konrad Hesse, Grundzuege des Verfassungsrechts der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 34 MARGIN No. 92 (14th ed. 1984). In addition, West Berlin
maintained special status under Allied control.
20. HucKo, supra note 1, at 194-265. The Basic Law begins with a strong bill of rights
section outperforming its American counterpart in several aspects. For instance, with the
exception of the freedom of expression, the German Basic Law grants more rights in a less
restricted way, such as the right to privacy, the right to one's own papers, and the supervi-
sion of telephone-tapping.
21. Befehl Nr. 1 Ober die Organisation der Militarverwaltung zur Verwaltung der
sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Deutshland of June 9th, 1945 [Command number one con-
cerning the organization of the military administration to administer the Soviet occupation
zone in Germany], reprinted in v.MUnch, 285.
22. The other half of Pomerania is now in Polish territory.
23. The latter two formed the heart of Prussia, which was again abolished - this time
by the Allied powers - as an ill-conceived scapegoat for the rise of Nazism. Gesetz Nr. 46
des Kontrollrats betreffend Aufl6sung des Staates Preussen vom Feb. 25, 1947 [law number
46 of the supervising council concerning the dissolution of the state of Prussia], ABI des
Kontrollrats Nr. 14, Mar. 31, 1947, at 262, cited in ROPER, supra note 10, at 153.
24. Id. at 158.
25. Ferdinand Protzman, Thousands Swell Trek to the West by East Germans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al.
26. New Face, Old Politics, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1989, at 52; PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 8,
1989, at Al.
27. Ferdinand Protzman, Clamor in the East; East Berliners Explore Land Long For-
bidden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1989, at Al.
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Republic of Germany.2"
In joining the Federal Republic, East Germany reintroduced the
Ltinder.2 9 The Basic Law presupposes that each state has its own consti-
tution, 30 and so does the East German "Law to Reintroduce the
Ltinder."' Article 23(2) § 1 empowers the parliaments to write their own
constitutions.
After East Germany acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany on
Oct. 3, 1990,32 the obligation of the five new states to enact constitutions
derives from the Basic Law as well. All five state parliaments enacted
preliminary organizational statutes"3 and drafted constitutions of varying
stages of development, 4 and Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen
have enacted constitutions." The disputes surrounding these constitu-
tions and drafts have influenced the constitutional committee, which by
now has begun drafting the new Federal Constitution of Germany."6
III. CHANGES IN THE BASIC LAW
The changes to the Basic Law have either been imposed by the Al-
lies, after World War II, or were deemed necessary by the two German
states themselves to achieve unification. In order to receive the consent of
the Allied powers and to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions,
the two Germanies agreed on important changes of the Basic Law. The
two Germanies committed themselves to accept their borders after unifi-
cation as definitive 7 in order to limit their military forces," to finance
28. Basic Law, art. 23 formed the constitutional basis for the accession of the five new
states to the already existing Federal Republic of Germany. Article 146 suggests forming a
new German state by joining the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic
under a new constitution, but this alternative was not chosen. Burkhard Bastuck, Unity,
Law, and Freedom: Legal Aspects of the Process and Results of German Unification, 25
INT'L LAW. 251, 255 (1991).
29. Verfassungsgesetz zur Bildung von Ldndern in der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik (Landereinfiihrungsgesetz) [Law of the constitution for the formation of the lands
of the German Democratic Republic], July 22, 1990, art. 1(1), GB1 I, Nr. 51 at 995.
30. Art. 28(I) § 1, Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pieroth, Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Kommentar, 370 art. 28 margin no. 1 (1989).
31. Art. 3(2) § 1; ROPER, supra note 10, at 150.
32. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, at 457. According to article 1(1), the
five new states join the Federal Republic, and according to article 1(2), the 11 Eastern and
the 12 Western districts of Berlin form the new state of Berlin.
33. For example, Gesetz zur Herstellung der Arbeitsfdhigkeit des Sachsischen
Landtags und der Sdchsischen Landesregierung (Vorschaltgesetz), Oct. 27, 1990, Sichs
GVBI, 1 (Law to Achieve the Working Capability of the Saxon Parliament).
34. Draft Constitution of the State of Brandenburg of May 5, 1991, 9 GVBI Branden-
burg 96 (1991); Draft Constitution of the Free State of Saxony of June 1991, as published
by The Committee For Constitution and Law; for Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
mern, see supra note 3. ROPER, supra note 10, at 151, n.7.
35. See supra note 3.
36. The committee began working on Jan. 16, 1992. Scholz und Voscherau Vorsitzende
der Verfassungskommission, F.A.Z., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
37. Treaty on the Final Settlement, supra note 6, art. 1.
1992
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the withdrawal and the settlement of the Soviet military forces,39 and to
redefine the membership of a united Germany in NATO. 40 In treaties and
negotiations with Poland 4' and the new leadership in Czechoslovakia,42
Germany further sought to calm the fears and insinuations raised world-
wide at that time. 4' The international obligation to change the Basic Law
was fulfilled in article 4 of the Treaty on the Unity of Germany and was
implemented upon ratification by both German parliaments.
A. The Preamble
The preamble of the former constitution of West Germany expressed
the desire to reunite and the duty of the German people to exercise their
right to self-determination. The former preamble characterized the Basic
Law as a temporary constitution enacted for the benefit of those who
38. Id. art. 3(2). The article states the obligation to reduce the number of troops to
370,000 men. The present number is about 600,000. Robert C. Toth, U.S. and Soviets in
Accord on Cutting Arms in Europe, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al.
39. Treaty on the Final Settlement, supra note 6, art. 4(1) only states the obligation to
settle by treaty the conditions for and the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces as
well as the conduct of their withdrawal.
40. Id. arts. 5 and 6; Volker Busse, Das certragliche Werk der deutschen Einheit und
die Anderungen von Verfassungsrecht, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 345, 346 (1991).
41. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen iber
die Bestditigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenzen, BGB1 I 1329 (1991)(Treaty con-
cerning the Confirmation of the Boundary between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Polish Republic), Nov, 14, 1990, F.R.G.-Pol. Jochen A. Frowein, Germany Reunited, 51
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLIcHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [Journal of Foreign
Public Law and International Law] 333, 341 (1991).
42. Vertrag vom 27 Februar zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der Tschechischen und
Slowakischen Fbderativen Republik Uiber gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit, 21 BGB1 II 461 (1992)(Treaty of Good Neighborship and Friendly Coop-
eration between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic).
43. Regarding France, see Philip Jackson, Fears of Germany Rekindled in France, THE
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990 (quotes claim that more than 60% of the French are afraid of Germany).
In contrast, another source cites only 27% of the French as feeling uneasy about unification.
NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION, Oct. 3, 1990, at 18. Regarding Great Britain, see Thatcher
Anxious over German Domination, Congratulates Kohl, Reuters, Oct. 3, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
Regarding Israel and the Jewish Community, see Douglas Devin, A Few, Lonely Voices
Fear the New Germany, The Face of the Colossus, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 3, 1990; The New
Germany, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 3, 1990. In a very unpleasant confrontation, the World
Jewish Congress, later joined by many other Jewish Groups, attacked Chancellor Helmut
Kohl for meeting Austrian President Waldheim on March 27, 1992. Kohl retorted by dis-
closing East German documents which showed the WJC conspired with East Germany's
deposed dictator Honecker against unification - claims which the WJC pronounced as exag-
gerated by the East Germans. Kohl Criticized for Waldheim Meeting, Responds Angrily to
Major Jewish Groups, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992 at A13.
Turkey's President Turgut Ozal joined anti-German critics and invoked Germany's
Nazi past when Germany refused to deliver weaponry that Turkey needed to fight Kurdish
separatists. Turk Cites Nazism in Attack on Bonn over Kurdish Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1992 at A6.
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were denied their right of self-determination. These declarations referred
not only to the population of the former German Democratic Republic
but also to the vast stretches of originally German territory occupied by
Poland and the Soviet Union after World War II. With the Treaty on the
Unity of Germany, the declarations pertaining to reunification and self-
determination were deleted and. substituted by the statement that the
Basic Law now applies to the whole German people. The legislature
thereby declared the process of reunification complete and relinquished
one fourth of the territory of former Germany in the borders of 1937."" In
addition, the reference to the Basic Law as a temporary constitution was
deleted.
B. Article 146
Article 146 of the new Basic Law represents the result of hasty politi-
cal negotiations rather than precise legal craftsmanship. The old article
146 stressed the temporary character of the Basic Law by promising a
general referendum on a constitution after reunification. Due to a lack of
coordination between Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Min-
ister of the Interior Wolfgang Schiuble,'9 and in order to assure support
by the opposition,' this article was not deleted from the Basic Law but
amended by a formulation parallel to that of the preamble. It states that
"the Basic Law now applies to the whole German People." As a result,
the present form of article 146 still appears to refer to the Basic Law as a
temporary constitution subject to substitution by a new constitution and
a referendum, which is arguably inconsistent with the preamble and with
the political will of the present German Government."7 The present con-
stitution, therefore, may be vulnerable to being overruled by a simple ma-
jority in a referendum or even in the German parliament.' s Two views
attempt to reconcile this inconsistency. One possibility is to subject the
amended constitution to a popular referendum, and another is to simply
disregard the possible inconsistencies in its wording.' 9
C. Articles 51(II), 135a, and 143
The changes of the Basic Law articles 51(11), 135a and 143 involve
the internal distribution of power in the federation, questions of finance,
and the time-frame for adjusting the East German body of law to that of
West Germany. Article 51(11) assures the bigger states in the Federation,
44. Henry Kamm, Anxiety Tugs at Germany's Jews, Bitterness Sears the Die-Hard
Nationalists, Sense of Mourning, Not Elation, For the Disappointed Expellees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1990 at A10.
45. WOLFGANG SCHAUBLE, DER VERTRAG (The Treaty] 120-21 (1991).
46. Id.; Busse, supra note 40, at 345-54.
47. This is the opinion of the opposition Social Democrats. SCHAUBLE, supra note 45, at
120.
48. Busse, supra note 40, at 351, n.47e.
49. For the latter view, see Busse, supra note 40, at 352.
1992
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those comprising more than 7 million inhabitants, that the smaller states
cannot form a two-thirds majority against them in the Bundesrat, the
upper house of Germany's national legislature.50 This provision assured
passage of the Treaty of the Unity of Germany by the Bundesrat with the
required two-thirds majority.
Article 135a provides that the new Germany reserves the power to
extinguish or restrict claims against the former East German Republic
and to deny or restrict claims by victims of the actions of the Communist
regime. 1
Article 143 was changed to avoid issues that threatened to delay the
signing of the Treaty of the Unity of Germany by the two German states.
Article 143 grants a period of adjustment to the East German body of
law. 2 East German law must comply with the constitutional require-
ments of the Basic Law by December 31, 1992. This applies most impor-
tantly to East Germany's more lenient criminal law regarding abortion,
StGB article 153-155, which allows abortion once the mother has been
informed about the medical risks .5 The West German StGB article 218,
which outlaws abortion, but creates exceptions that have virtually eroded
the prohibition, was not to enter into force in the East."' Instead, the
legislature was called upon to introduce a new law. 5 The new law advo-
cated a more thorough information requirement for the mother but aban-
doned the exception-rule of StGB article 218. It was challenged before
the Constitutional Court and will not enter into force until a decision has
been rendered.58 Until then, the East German StGB articles 153-155 will
remain in force.5
The most controversial effect of article 143 is the constitutional as-
surance that it gives to article 41, which declares the brutal expropria-
tions by the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1949 irreversible. 8 When
challenged in the Constitutional Court, the German government defended
its consent to these regulations as necessary to assure the Soviet Union's
agreement to unification. 9 This view was accepted by the Constitutional
50. Id. at 350. There are four states in this category: Baden-Wuirttemberg, Bavaria,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia.
51. Id.
52. SCHAUBLE, supra note 45, at 229-50.
53. Rainer Beckmann, Zur Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs im
Einigungsvertrag [Toward the constitutionality of abortion within the treaty], 2 M.D.R.
117, 118 (1991).
54. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 9(11), in conjunction with annex
II Ch. III, matter C, para. I, Nos. 1, 4 and 5; Beckmann, supra note 53, at 118; Nomi Morris,
Tough Challenge for Germany - A Unified Abortion Law, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1992 at
A10; Busse, supra note 40, at 351.
55. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 31, para. IV §1.
56. Der Bundesrat stimmt Fristenregelung mit Beratungspflicht zu, F.A.Z., July 11,
1992 at 1; Karlsruhe setzteine knappe Frist fir Antrdge, F.A.Z., Aug. 6, 1992 at 1.
57. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 34, para. 4 § 4.
58. Basic Law art. 143(111).
59. Secretary of State Kastrup in his pleadings before the federal Constitutional Court.
VOL. 21:1
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Court in 1991.0 The most bizarre effect of this rule is that those members
of the German resistance movement against Hitler, whom the Nazis were
unable to expropriate in the turmoil of the last days of the war, were
subsequently expropriated by the Soviet or East German authorities as
"capitalists, fascists or aristocrats" between 1945 and 1949, and will not
be able to return to their homes. Those whose property was expropriated
by the Nazis before 1945, along with other victims of Nazism like Jewish
Germans, political opponents, and those whose property the East German
Communists expropriated after 1949, are entitled to a return of their old
property or indemnification.
The absurdity of this result of expropriation along with other factors
suggest that the East German leaders, many still imbued with Commu-
nist ideas or connected to the East German secret police,"1 succeeded in
justifying the brutal results of the Communist reign of East Germany.6 2
This result is evidenced by the foreseeable decline of the Soviet Union as
a political force coupled with the weak proof advanced for the foreign
relations argument during the oral arguments in the Constitutional Court.
Justifying these results was in accord with West German financial experts
afraid of having to pay enormous amounts of compensation.6
IV. FUTURE CHANGES OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION
Decisive changes of the German Federal constitution will take place
within the next ten years. The German constitution will have to adapt to
the changes caused by unification,6 by the creation of the European
Judgment of Apr. 23, 1991, Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGe], 1 BvR
1170, 1174, 1175/90 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 44 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHFlrr [N.J.W.]
1597, 1598 (1991).
60. 44 N.J.W., supra note 59, at 1597.
61. Lothar de Maiziere, East Germany's first and last democratic prime minister, who
signed the Unification Treaty for East Germany, had to step down from most of his political
posts after unification due to charges that he had worked for the East German secret police,
STASI. Rolf Soderlind, East German Politician Faces New Stasi Allegations, Reuters, Feb.
16, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Current File.
62. Walter Leisner, Das Bodenreform- Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 44 N.J.W.
1569 (1991).
63. "Der Bundesfinanzminister sitzt auf einem Pulverfasz, denn es geht um viele Mil-
liarden D-Mark. Mir hat er damit zu verdanken, wenn es nicht noch teurer wird." SCHXU-
BLE, supra note 45, at 255. ("The Minister of Finance sits on a powder keg, since this is a
matter of billions of D-Mark. He should thank me if it doesn't get more expensive").
64. The Basic Law, article 5, recommends the German legislative bodies to consider
above all, but not exclusively, the following issues for amendment:
1. The inclusion of political aims into the Basic Law.
2. The application of Basic Law, article 146, and the question of a referendum
on the new constitution.
3. The strengthening of federalism with possible changes of Basic Law, article
24(I). The old German states witnessed a constant erosion of their rights due
to Federal supremacy clauses and due to the delegation of jurisdiction to the
European Community and have therefore agreed to strengthen their role
against the Federation. Eckart Klein, Der Einigungsvertrag: Verfassung-
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Community, 5 and by Germany's new role in the world.66 This article will
sprobleme und auftrage, 14 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 569, 575-76 (1991).
See also Busse, supra note 40, at 352-53. Among others the process of unifica-
tion on a European scale has led the Liinder to demand consultation and vot-
ing rights with regard to foreign relations. Bundesstaat oder Staatenbund?,
Streit iiber die aussenpolitischen Kompetenzen der Lander, F.A.Z., Mar. 21,
1992, at 4; Klein, supra, at 576.
4. The forming of a new state by joining the states of Berlin and Brandenburg.
Id.
Regarding these four points, article 5 constitutes an agreement between the major parties
rather than between the two Germanies, with the Social Democrats and the Greens in favor
of a new constitution, and the Christian Democrats and the Liberals in favor of a limited
revision. Busse, supra note 40, at 352.
65. The ratification of the Maastricht treaty is accompanied by changes of the Basic
Law. A bill to change the Basic law has been forwarded to the Bundesrat. This bill includes,
inter alia, the insertion of a new article 23 to accommodate the rights of the Liinder in a
future, more integrated European Community, and to allow and regulate the transfer of
powers from the German federal level to the EC, as a supranational entity; changes to arti-
cle 24 regarding the transfer of powers from the state level; article 28 will be changed to
allow citizens from other EC states to vote on a communal level; and article 88 will reduce
the powers of the German Federal Bank in favor of a European one. Bundesstaat oder
Staatenbund?, Streit iiber die aussenpolitischen Kompetenzen der Lander, F.A.Z., Mar. 21,
1992 at 4; Der neue Europa Artikel im Grundgesetz, Nach der Einigung Deutschlands wird
die Verfassung auf die Einheit Europas verpflichtet, F.A.Z., July 22, 1992, at 4.
A further, rather complex change of the Basic Law regards its right to asylum in article
16. As immigration control will be abolished along with custom controls at intra-EC fron-
tiers, Germany's very liberal right to asylum will have to be lowered to an EC average level.
Die Leute haben den Zirkus satt, CDU und CSU beharren auf Grundgesetztinderungen
zum Asylrecht, F.A.Z., Mar. 17, 1992 at 5.
66. This primarily concerns the question whether the German army should be allowed
to participate in UN peace keeping actions or even in combat operations, such as the actions
against Iraq. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the oppositional Social Demo-
crats have argued that the Basic Law would not permit the German army, Bundeswehr, to
participate in such actions. They cite article 87a which allows the Bundeswehr only to act in
defense of Germany or where the Basic Law contains an express provision. Many in the
Christian Democratic Union and most legal scholars, however, interpret article 87 only to
prohibit the internal use of the Bundeswehr, i.e. a prohibition to use it as a police force.
Instead, they argue, the permission and the obligation to send troops under UN command
derives from article 24(11). Nahe dran am echten Krieg, 30 DER SPIEGEL 22, 27-28 (1992);
Albrecht Randelzhofer, in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Theodor Maunz and Giinther
DUrig eds.), Art. 24(11), Margin no. 44, 46 and 56 (Dec. 1989 update). This question will be
clarified by the Constitutional Court in its decision on an action by the Social Democratic
Party against the participation of German Navy units in surveillance of the coasts of Yugo-
slavia. Organklage der SPD beim Verfassungsgericht eingebracht, F.A.Z., Aug. 10, 1992 at
2. For a discussion of the constitutional problems, see generally, Thomas Giegerich, German
Contribution in the Persian Gulf, 49 ZA0. R.V. 1, 38-40 (1989).
From a political point of view, due to Germany's past, a general anti-militarist attitude
in the population, Krieg, supra, and the rather contradictory demands by the international
community evidenced by the criticism of Germany for not participating in combat actions
against Iraq, and yet the condemnation for political intervention against Serbian mass mili-
tary attacks against light armed Croatian militias - attempts to change the Basic Law have
failed so far. The continued bloodshed in Bosnia and Croatia, however, will probably change
public opinion. Ian Murray, Bonn Fails to Widen Role of the Army, THE TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1992; Parteien uneins 0iber UNO-Einsitze der Bundeswehr, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17,
1992, at 2; CDU-MdB Karl Lamers, Von deutscher Drflckebergerei, 12 DER SPIEGEL 22
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have to limit its scope to the changes of the constitution that have al-
ready been dealt with in the constitutions and draft constitutions of the
five new German states. The Treaty on the Unity of Germany, article 5,
among others, recommends the German legislature to include political
aims in the constitution.6 7 The recommendation of the Treaty on the
Unity of Germany will cause the political discussions that have been
fought on this subject on a state level, and which mirror the slow process
of integration of the Eastern states into a Western constitutional system,
to be repeated on the Federal level, where the problems of integration
will surface again. Therefore this article will first describe the constitu-
tional doctrine of fundamental rights and state aims in state constitu-
tions, and then will analyze its realization in the draft constitutions of the
new states, and will finally describe the analogies that can be drawn on a
Federal level.
A. State Constitutions and Fundamental Constitutional Rights
The inclusion of fundamental rights in the constitutions of the five
new states - though not essential from a legal point of view - assures
their citizens of the rights guaranteed by the Basic Law and serves as a
means of identification with the new federal state. A constitution identi-
fies the organs of a state: their creation, their relationships to each other,
their powers, and their limitations. In addition, it identifies the funda-
mental rights of its subjects.6 s The Basic Law allocates the powers to the
federal organs and guarantees fundamental rights without regard to the
federal or state level.6 9 Since the German federal tradition presupposes
(1992); FDP-MdB and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bald werden sich die
Deutschen an Blauhelm-Einsatzen beteiligen; Marc Fisher, Germany Facing Harsher Crit-
icism, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1992, at All. Only 22% in the East and 38% in the West are in
favor of German participation in UN actions. Renate Kocher, Viel Ziindstoff fur die Verfas-
sungsdebatte, F.A.Z., Dec. 4, 1991, at 5; Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe "Das ist keine
Drohgebarde," 30 DER SPIEGEL 32, 34 (1992).
67. German constitutional law has so far differentiated between political aims, Staats-
zielen, and fundamental rights, Grundrechten. Political aims do not accord rights to an
individual but define objective standards to be met by the state. Konrad Hesse, 14 MARGIN
No. 82, at 213 (1984). The translations of Staatsziel vary: "a norm describing a goal to be
pursued by the state," Philip Kunig, The Principle of Social Justice, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
BASIC LAW 187, 194 n.22 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988); or "state objective," Eckart Klein,
Human Rights of a 3d Generation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW 72 (Ulrich Karpen ed.
1988). In contrast, fundamental rights are subjective rights of a defensive or even positive
character. Of a defensive character are the classical freedoms; of a positive character are the
institutional guarantees, for example those that give private schools a right to state support.
Basic Law art. 7. Private ownership is both, art. 14.
68. GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE [General Government Theory] 505 (3rd
ed. 1914); Peter Badura, Direkte Teilhabe oder mittelbare Demokratie, F.A.Z., Dec. 13,
1991, at 8. This is very similar to the American doctrine. THOMAS C. MARKS & JOHN F.
COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-6 (1988).
69. Konrad Hesse, Grundziige des Verfassungsrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
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statehood of the Lander in the fullest sense, the primary task of their
constitutions is to define the organizational powers on a state level.
When allocating these different powers, the Lander are left with a
wide margin of discretion that finds its limitations in the principle of ho-
mogeneity.". According to the principle of homogeneity, the Ldnder are
obliged to observe the republican and democratic structure based on the
rule of law, Rechtsstaatsprinzip, as well as on social justice, Sozialstaats-
prinzip.7 The principle of homogeneity excludes, for example, the possi-
bility of a state becoming a monarchy or redistributing the allocation of
power but allows it to choose different electoral systems or government
structures.7 2 The principle of homogeneity above all applies to the protec-
tion of fundamental constitutional rights, such as human rights, citizen's
rights, or institutional guarantees."2 As a result, state constitutions may
not diverge from the tenets laid out by the Basic Law but are free to
create new rights.
74
Nevertheless, fundamental rights are mainly protected by the Basic
Law, which directly applies in the Liinder,75 and which preempts conflict-
ing state law. 76 Therefore, legislatures need not enumerate fundamental
rights in the state constitutions at all. Even mere references to the Basic
Law appearing in some of the state constitutions7 7 appears to be superflu-
ous from a technical point of view.
Many Ldinder have nevertheless added fundamental rights sections
to their constitutions, which rarely confer constitutional protection to
substantial rights not already recognized by the Basic Law, including
most notably minority rights78 and social rights.79 For instance, minority
land, 17 MARGIN No. 90 (1990); THEODOR MAUNZ & REINHOLD ZIPPELIUs, DEUTSCHES STAATS-
RECHT, 115 (28 ed. 1991); Badura, supra note 68, at 8.
70. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
71. Basic Law art. 28(1) §1; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 114; Kunig, supra
note 67, at 187, 189. A similar requirement upheld the 1949 Constitution of the G.D.R., art.
109(1) §1.
72. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1968, 24 BVerfGE 367, 390 (F.R.G.)(regarding monarchy);
Judgment of June 10, 1953, 2 BVerfGE 307, 319(regarding allocation of power); Judgment of
Oct. 23, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 14, 44 (F.R.G.)(regarding electoral systems); Judgment of July 22,
1969, 27 BVerfGE 44, 56 (F.R.G.)(regarding government structures); MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS,
supra note 69, at 116.
73. Basic Law art. 28(3); MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
74. Basic Law art. 142. ; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
75. Hesse, supra note 69; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
76. Basic Law arts. 31, 142.
77. Constitution of Baden Wuirttemberg, art. 2, one of the old states; Draft-Constitu-
tion of Mecklenburg Vorpommern by D. Poetzsch-Heffter - a reference to the fundamental
rights is enviseaged in the preamble, Sven Holscheidt, Verfassungsberatungen kommen gut
voran, 32 DAS PARLAMENT [Das Parl.], Aug. 2, 1991, at 7.
78. Constitution of Schleswig Holstein, art. . .for the Danish minority; Draft-Constitu-
tion of Brandenburg of May 31, 1991, art. 26, 2 GVBI No. 9, 96 (1991) for the Sorben
(Wenden), a Slavic minority; Draft-Constitution of the Free State of Saxony of October
1990, arts. 6 and 6a for the Sorbs and the Silesians, a German minority whose mainland now
belongs to Poland.
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rights had already received a high level of protection in article 113 of the
Constitution of Weimar.80 Although social rights had not been afforded
protection, the Constitution of Weimar nevertheless included rather con-
tradictory liberal and socialist economic doctrines.8 1
The example of the state constitutions and drafts has rekindled the
discussion of minority and social rights in the Basic Law.8 2 Although the
Basic Law is unlikely to incorporate similar changes, the phrasing of old
fundamental rights in the new drafts and the inclusion of new rights and
state aims reflect the state of the German society and the changes it is
undergoing. The language pertaining to these social rights in the drafts of
the five new states is reminiscent of the past socialist regime, but it is this
transitional language that represents the present state of their popula-
tions.s The slow adoption of Western constitutional doctrine mirrors this
gradual change. In addition, the inclusion of fundamental rights helps to
integrate and to stabilize the population," still defiant of state authority
after nearly sixty years of national-socialist and communist
dictatorships."5
In addition, state constitutions with fundamental rights stress the
autonomy of the states against the federal authority and work towards
strengthening federalism. The creation of a strong identification with
the state, instead of with the Federal Republic, will be more successful in
the East due to several factors, such as historic frontiers, less exposure to
modern media or a "circling-of-the-wagons mentality" in the face of per-
ceived Western hegemony.8 7 Confirming this trend, the reallocation of
powers between the states and the federal institutions has been specifi-
cally mentioned in the recommendations for an amendment of the Treaty
of the Unity of Germany. 8
79. See e.g. Draft Constitution of Brandenburg art. 26 (rights of the Sorbs), art. 29
(right to adult education), art. 47 (right to a home), art. 48 (right to work); Draft Constitu-
tion of the Free State of Saxony, art. 6a (rights of the Sorbs), art. 7 (right of a decent
living), art. 9 (rights of children). According to the Saxon draft, however, these rights do not
have the same force as fundamental rights.
80. OTTo KIMMINICH, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 492 (1970).
81. Schneider, supra note 14, §3.
82. Klein, supra note 64, at 576 (regarding minorities, i.e. the Frisian and Danish mi-
nority in the North of Germany and the Sorbs, a Slavic minority in the states of Branden-
burg and Saxony). Thomas Darnstidt, Schone Worte fUrs Volk, 11 DER SPIEGEL 82, 90
(1992). MP for the Social Democrats, Hertha Diubler-Gmelin.
83. Saxony Minister of Justice, Steffen Heitmann, Sind neue Landerverfassungen
notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992, at 4.
84. Speech of Marko Schiemann, Member of the Saxon-Parliament, at the constitution
seminar of the Konrad-Adenauer-Endowment, Sept. 12, 1991, at 3.
85. Heitmann, supra note 83, at 4.
86. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
87. Bavaria stands as the only example in the West to stress its autonomy.
88. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 5.
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B. Constitutional Developments in the Five New States
1. Developments After the 1989 Revolution and Before
Reunification
Constitutional developments in the five new states have shown two
trends, one trying to preserve a modified version of socialism and a per-
ceived identity of East Germany, and the other preparing the five new
states for accession to the Federal Republic of Germany and its liberal
Basic Law. In the period between the opening of the Berlin Wall on No-
vember 9, 1989 and the accession to the Federal Republic on October 3,
1990, the one-party dictatorship of the SEDs9 slowly ceded its place to a
"Round Table" government, a transitional government of a motley oppo-
sition movement and of the old leaders, to be found in most countries
that abandoned communism at that time.90 The draft constitution of this
"Round Table"9 1 favored independence from the Federal Republic of
Germany and adhered to some socialist economic concepts, but it stressed
the importance of human rights.92
Fundamental rights in this draft constitution enjoy a higher level of
protection than in the Basic Law.93 In addition to increased social rights,
regional Round Tables tried to find alternatives to the Basic Law's alloca-
tion of powers by reinforcing the role of parliament."' Some other draft
constitutions, such as those written by the professors of the University of
Leipzig or by the heads of certain administrative districts,95 are blatantly
89. Sozialstische Einheitspartei Deutschland, Unified Socialist Party of Germany, that
takes its name from the partially forced union between the social democratic party, SPD,
and the Communist party, KPD, on Apr. 21 1946. The dissenting social democrats were
persecuted and many of them were killed.
90. Peter Haberle, Der Entwurf der Arbeitsgruppe "Neue Verfassung der DDR" des
Runden Tisches, 39 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS NF 319-349 (1990).
91. The transitional government rejected reenactment of the 1949 Constitution. ROPER,
supra note 10, at 150 n.4.
92. Draft Constitution of the Working-Group "New Constitution of the GDR [!]" of a
Round Table (Apr. 4, 1991), reprinted in 2 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ [Krit.J.] 226 (1990). The Draft
Constitution addresses human rights in arts. 1-40; the right to work in art. 27; the unlimited
possibility to expropriate in art. 31; the absence of employers' rights to defend against
strikes in art. 39(5) and (6); and the independence of the G.D.R. in art. 41ff. See also Ulrich
K. Preuss, Introductory Remarks Regarding Expropriations, 2 KRIT.J. 226 (1990). The his-
tory of this Draft Constitution is described in Uwe Thaysen, DAS PARL. 71, 257, 296 (1990).
93. This higher level of protection is reached by enumerating rights that the Basic Law
includes only through interpretations by the Constitutional Court, or by scholars, but it
does not specify or add any new rights not recognized by the Basic Law. An example of the
former is the right to leave the country, Draft Constitution art. 6(1), or the right to obtain
one's own data and the right to privacy, arts. 8(1) and 8(2). An example of the latter is the
prohibition to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, Draft Constitution art. 1(2) §
2.
94. For the Draft Constitution by a Round Table in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, see
Hblscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
95. Speech of Marko Schiemann, Member of the Saxony Parliament, before the Consti-
tution Committee of the three middle administrative districts (Bezirksverwaltungen) of
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socialist and attempt to save the old regime." In contrast, the Round Ta-
ble in Saxony decided to draft a constitution that was not only inspired
by the Basic Law but also anticipated reunification.9 7 In Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern a second draft constitution avoided conflicts on fundamen-
tal rights or economic theories by limiting its scope to an organizational
statute.98 Only the revised form of the Saxon draft constitution and the
drafts in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern survived to be considered by the
state parliaments elected in the fall of 1990. This might be welcomed as a
slow but steady retreat of the old regime and its ideologies or as a victory
for the West German constitutional doctrine. On the other hand, the de-
velopment of alternatives or ameliorations was neglected in favor of
rather hasty, Basic Law-oriented draftsmanship. 9
As in the elections to the parliaments of the five new states, the
sometimes Utopian grass roots optimism of the civil rights movements
did not find a majority and their drafts were discarded. On the Federal
Level, this development was mirrored by the fate of an alternative consti-
tution'0 0 presented to the public by a motley group of left-wing and green
prominent citizens from the West and the East. This constitution at-
tempted to transform society into a peaceful ecological society with a
grass root-based government.' 0' Its phrasing and content evoked the com-
munist past of some of its authors, including the writer Christa Wolf.' 2
However, only a few of the proposals made by the group have been intro-
duced into the discussion of the committee to change the constitution.'0 3
2. Constitutional Developments in the Parliaments
Since the 1990 parliamentary elections in the five new states, proce-
dural rules such as the composition of the constitutional committees and
voting requirements have gained importance. Constitutional committees
were established in all five new states, although only Brandenburg cre-
ated its committee through legislation.'
In Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, the committees are com-
Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz, Apr. 18, 1990.
96. Id.
97. Concluding Remarks to the First Gohrisch Draft Constitution (1990).
98. Verfassung fir Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Draft by von Mutius and Starck (Apr.
1991), reprinted in KOMMISSIONS-DRUCKSACHE 15 (June 5, 1991).
99. Jiirgen Schwabe, Anmerkungen zum Verfassungshandwerk, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
RECHTSPOLITIK 361-363 (1991).
100. See Volker Zastrow, Schone Ideen, Vorschlage eines "Kuratoriums" zur Grundge-
setzreform, F.A.Z., Jan. 15, 1992 at 10.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The oppositional SPD still favors a referendum. Zastrow, supra note 100, at 10.
The ruling CDU, especially the Eastern CDU, ranks amending the constitution as a low
priority in the face of daily problems. Interview with Stefan Heitman, Minister of Justice of
Saxony, reprinted in GiInter Bannas, Ein langer Wunschzettel, F.A.Z., Oct. 16, 1991, at 14.
104. 4th Draft Constitution of Brandenburg 26 (1991).
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posed of members of the parliament in proportion to their representation.
Legal experts also participate in their sessions. Following the distribution
of seats in Brandenburg, fifteen members of parliament and fifteen non-
parliamentarians, representing various social groups and nominated by
the parties, serve on the committee.'0 5 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
eleven parliamentarians are accompanied by four experts nominated by
the four parties represented in parliament; four experts from the civil
rights movement not represented in parliament; one representative from
the government; and legal advisors who do not vote.1"' The composition
of the committees will be decisive features of the constitutions. Admitting
representatives to these committees without any democratic legitimation
may be in deference to the role civil rights movements played in the
peaceful revolution in Mecklenburg. However, neither the civil rights
groups nor the social groups represent the population to be governed by
the constitution.10 7
A point of dispute is whether to enact the constitutions by plebiscite
or by vote in parliament. In addition, the parliaments must decide
whether the vote should be on one constitution, on alternative constitu-
tions, or even on each proposed article. This issue has been given wide-
spread media attention, especially by the newspapers that are still domi-
nated by socialists who hope to score points on such popular issues as the
right to work. 10 8 The major parties have avoided taking a clear position in
order to maintain their bargaining positions.
From a legal point of view, the parliaments have been given the pow-
ers of the pouvoir constituant, free to adopt a constitution.'0 9 Some have
argued that reintroducing the Lander under the Basic Law reintroduced
the former constitutions as well. 10 The parliaments would then have to
conform to the former law, requiring in Saxony, for example, a two-thirds
majority to create a new constitution."' The Saxon constitution was fi-
nally adopted by a two-thirds majority vote in parliament with the con-
sent of the oppositional Social Democratic Party."'
.105. Holscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
106. Christian Starck, Verfassungsgebung in den neuen Landern, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
GESETZGEBUNG 1, 8 (1992); H6lscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
107. In Brandenburg the constitutional committee has now decided to continue its
work without its non-parliamentarians. Die CDU will die Verfassung mittragen, F.A.Z.,
Dec. 21, 1991, at 4.
108. Interview with Professor Karl-Heinz Schbnburg, reprinted in Die grosse Furcht
der Unternehmer vor sozialen Rechten, Brandenburgs Verfassungsentwurf geht diese
Woche ins Landtagsplenum, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Dec. 17, 1991, at 5. Neues Deutschland
is the former party paper of the SED, formerly the ruling socialist party. In Saxony, the
PDS attempted to force parliament by plebiscite to have a plebiscite on the constitution. 10
Informationsdienst PDS (May 19, 1992).
109. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Speech Given at a Seminar of the Konrad Adenauer-Stif-
tung in Berlin, Sept. 9, 1991 (not published).
110. ROPER, supra note 10, at 168.
111. Id. at 168; 1947 Constitution of Saxony, art. 92(2).
112. Slichsischer Landtag beschlieszt die Verfassung, F.A.Z., May 27, 1992, at 1.
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From a political point of view, given the distrust of authorities in the
East and given that the constitutions of the five new states are supposed
to have an integrating effect immediately, a plebiscite on alternative con-
stitutions should be permitted. However, a plebiscite may cause embar-
rassment due to absenteeism of a population preoccupied with adapting
to Western economic standards.1 3 In Brandenburg, the legislators dared
to submit their constitution to a plebiscite, but although the constitution
was accepted by an overwhelming majority, voter turnout was below50%.114
The deadlines of the constitutions had to be postponed several times.
Brandenburg designated October 15, 1991 for the second and third ses-
sions in parliament, but eventually had to postpone the sessions following
heavy criticism of its draft. 15 Thuringia set the end of 1992 as the final
date for its constitution.' The other states have made informal commit-
ments that had to be postponed. For example, Saxony's informal time
schedule was similar to Brandenburg's,1 but even the sessions of the
constitutional committee have been interrupted due to procedural dis-
putes over the admission of legal advisors.
Similar problems occurred at the Federal level. The most important
issue will be whether Basic Law article 146, or other concerns, require a
general referendum on the final draft or on the amendments of the con-
stitution."' Procedural problems arose even before the constitutional
committee convened for the first time."' The ruling Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) attempted to dissociate the time frame for the committee's
final report from the year of general Federal elections in 1994 in order to
prevent the oppositional SPD and other parties from utilizing populist
constitutional issues. 20 The problem of advisors and special interest
groups also reappeared as Members of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag
requested to be included in the deliberations.' 2'
113. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5. Prior to reunification, only 14% of the West German
population was in favor of a reform of the Basic Law. After reunification, the upheavals in
the East, and the ensuing debate on immigration policy in Western Europe, 26% of the
West German and 58% of the East German population favored reform.
114. Id.
115. DER TAGESSP1EGEL, Sept. 17, 1991, at 7; F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 5.
116. Thuringer Landtag Drucksache 1/285 1 (Apr. 10, 1991) (referring to art. 18(2) of
the Preliminary Constitution).
117. Radio Interview with Christoph Partsch, Legal Advisor in the Parliament of the
Free State of Saxony, on Sachsen Radio, July 1991.
118. Darnsttidt, supra note 82, at 82, 90, and 93.
119. Uneinigkeit uber den Zeitplan der Verfassungskommission, F.A.Z., Nov. 8, 1991,
at 2.
120. Id.; Darnstddt, supra note 82, at 82, 90.
121. Id.; Vogel fordert mehr direkte Demokratie, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17, 1992,
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3. Selected Aspects of the Contents of the State Constitutions
a. Plebiscites
The drafters of the Basic Law witnessed the constant threat to par-
liamentarism posed by the disapproval of its constituency in the Weimar
Republic, 1 22 so they incorporated purely indirect democracy into their
document.12 In contrast, the new states have all incorporated various
forms of plebiscites into their draft constitutions in an attempt to enable
democratic participation by an electorate that has little experience in
democratic politics. The Western state constitutions also included plebis-
citarian elements, but they proved to be prohibitive in constitutional real-
ity. 24 In accordance with growing criticism in the West, especially by en-
vironmentalists and the parties of the left, 2 and in an attempt to mark a
difference with the old regime, all the draft constitutions contain varying
elements of direct democracy.
The constitution of conservatively-ruled Saxony 2 ' permits citizens to
demand that parliament enact a statute by collecting 40,000 signatures.'2 7
Should parliament refuse or neglect to enact the statute, a minimum of
450,000 signatures is necessary to initiate a referendum. 28 In the final
draft, the CDU proposed, as a bargaining chip, a requirement that at
least 50%(!) of the eligible votes would be necessary to pass a referen-
dum. 129 This nearly prohibitive obstacle was dropped, and instead the
number to initiate a referendum was raised from 200,000 to 450,000.2 ° In
addition, the Saxon draft constitution proposes that a referendum may be
initiated by one-third of the members of parliament on a statute already
voted on, but not yet promulgated. 3 '
In Brandenburg, governed by a coalition of the Social Democrats and
the Eastern Green Party, only 20,000 signatures are needed to demand
that parliament enact a statute,'3 2 and initiating a referendum requires
only 80,000 signatures. 33 An affirmative vote by at least one quarter of
122. CRAIG, supra note 8, at 416-17.
123. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Citizens' Participation in State Functioning, in RIGHTS,
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 159-
60, 169 (Christian Starck ed., 1987).
124. Graf Vitzthum, supra note 123, at 171-72.
125. Id.
126. In Saxony, the center-right CDU forms the government alone.
127. Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 71(1).
128. Id., art. 72(2).
129. Id., art. 72(5). The Gohrischer draft demanded a majority of at least one-third of
the eligible votes; the SPD, the oppositional Social Democratic party, demanded a majority
of at least one-fifth; the PDS, the party succeeding the formerly ruling communist SED,
proposed a simple majority of the votes.
130. Compare Draft Constitution art. 72(5) with Constitution art. 72(2).
131. Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 73.
132. Constitution of the State of Brandenburg, art. 76(1).
133. Id., art. 77(3).
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the eligible votes is sufficient to pass the act.13 1 In addition, the Branden-
burg constitution permits 150,000 signatures to demand enactment of a
statute, 200,000 signatures to initiate a referendum, and a two-thirds ma-
jority of at least half of the eligible voters to dissolve parliament. 3 5
Although the states differ in population, 3 6 the rift between the re-
quirements of the two states is apparent. While the obstacles to a plebi-
scite were shifted to an earlier stage in the Saxon constitution, Branden-
burg entrusts a mere one quarter of its electorate to bypass the legislative
mechanism of its otherwise representative democracy. To grant a fraction
of the population considerable influence appears to be dangerous in a so-
ciety that has found it easier to adapt to Western materialism than to
Western democratic thinking.' 37 But even in Saxony, the communist PDS
lost no time and had no difficulty in obtaining the required 40,000 signa-
tures to demand a referendum. 138 Especially in a time of economic recon-
struction, the population in the five new states tends to cherish such "ad-
vantages of the old system" as the alleged absence of unemployment and
the availability of kindergartens.139 In addition, a rather quixotic voting
pattern by the citizenry in the five new states 4" undermines confidence
that the Eastern population will master the responsibilities of direct de-
mocracy. For example, the PDS is apparently the only party with confi-
dence of obtaining the required votes from its still well organized sup-
porters, and it favors the elimination of all minimum requirements in
plebiscites.1 4 1
Finally, some plebiscitarian characteristics in the state constitutions
might conflict with the Basic Law and, therefore, might be considered
unconstitutional. Article 2(4) of the Brandenburg constitution, for exam-
ple, puts legislation by plebiscite on equal ground with legislation by par-
liament. The Basic Law, however, interpreted in accord with the principle
of homogeneity, gives priority to a representative democracy at the state
level, while accepting certain forms of plebiscites.142 State law that deci-
sively alters the distribution of powers is unconstitutional."' 3 To give
134. Id., art. 78(2).
135. Id., arts. 76(1), 77(3), 78(2). The numbers in the draft constitution had been
slightly lower, 100,000 and 150,000. Draft Constitution arts. 78(1), 79(3).
136. Saxony has 3.71 million citizens; Brandenburg has 1.95 million; Saxony-Anhalt has
2.23 million. Starck, supra note 106, at 17.
137. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5.
138. They obtained 47,037 signatures. Kein Volksentscheid zu Sachsens Verfassung,
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, May 26, 1992.
139. Id. A similar development can be witnessed in other countries recently liberated
from Communism, such as Poland. Many Poles Now See '81 Martial Law as Justified, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at A8.
140. Compare the smooth voting patterns in the Western state to the rather abrupt and
incoherent changes in the Eastern states. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5.
141. Alternate Draft Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 72(5), proposed by
the PDS and the Eastern Green Party.
142. Jarass & Pieroth, supra note 30, at 370.
143. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 114, 438.
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plebiscites equal effect would reduce the parliament's power decisively
and transform Brandenburg into a direct democracy. As a result, Bran-
denburg constitution article 2(4) might be declared unconstitutional by
the court. In addition, the Brandenburg constitution grants plebiscitarian
rights to foreigners and stateless persons as well. 14 4 This would clearly
conflict with the present Basic Law.'"
On the Federal level, these developments began to take shape when
the Social Democratic Party demanded more elements of direct democ-
racy in the new constitution.'" Opponents argue that plebiscites on a fed-
eral level would allow minorities to take advantage of absenteeism and
push through populist or even minority views. 47 The shift of power from
the states to the Federal level has decreased resistance to plebiscites on
the state level. However, such resistance remains strong at the Federal
level, rendering the implementation of plebiscites at the Federal level
improbable.
b. Fundamental Rights and Political Aims
The constitutions in the five new states attempt to mix traditional
and newly developed fundamental rights with political aims. Fundamen-
tal rights, Grundrechte, are subjective rights of a defensive or even posi-
tive character,"' 8 while political aims, Staatsziele, do not accord rights to
an individual but define objective standards to be met by the state. 9
Except for one of the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern draft constitutions, all
of the new states have chosen to include fundamental rights sections sim-
ilar to that of the Basic Law in order to stress the rights East Germans
are now able to enjoy. Careless rewording of Basic Law articles in the
state constitutions and blind copying of negligent formulations in the Ba-
sic Law are possible disadvantages of this practice. 5 ' Some of the new
144. Peter J. Winters, Keine grundslitzliche Immunitait, Brandenburgs Verfassung-
sentwurf, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 4. The draft constitution left this open to interpretation
since it did not define "citizens," jede Birgerin und jeder Birger, as entitled to start a
plebiscite in article 78(1) or to vote in article 23(1). Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363. The
Constitution in article 76(1) uses Einwohner, resident, and article 22(1) uses Burger as well.145. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, 80 BVerfGe 37-59, 60-81 (decision of the Constitutional
Court on voting rights of foreigners on the community level in Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein).
146. Vogel fordertmehr direkte Demokratie, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17, 1992, at 2.
147. Zastrow, supra note 100, at 10; Badura, supra note 68, at 8.
148. The classical freedoms are defensive by nature, and the institutional guarantees
that give private schools a right to state support, for example, are positive. Basic Law art. 7.
Private ownership is both, art. 14.
149. Hesse, supra note 67, at 213.
150. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 362, 363. For an example of careless rewording, see
Saxon draft constitution art. 7(6), which reduces the state's duty to observe a political airm
by profuse definition; Brandenburg draft constitution arts. 23(1) and 78(1) do not define the
legal term citizen and use it differently, jede Btirgerin as opposed to simply BUrgerin. Fo,
an example of careless copying, see Saxon draft constitution art. 17(1), which copies thE
unfortunate wording of Basic Law art. 3(1) ("..vor dem Gesetz gleich") that appears to ex.
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states have decided to delete fundamental rights that have been implied
into the Basic Law by the Constitutional Court.'5 1 These clarifications
appear to help avoid misconceptions about the existence of such rights.
52
Unfortunately, other unwritten fundamental rights that may be even
more important to East Germans, such as the right to leave the country,
have also been left out.153
The principle of homogeneity permits states to grant additional, or
more extensive fundamental rights, and some of the new states have cho-
sen to do so. 15 Brandenburg's draft created a variety of new fundamental
rights, such as the right to social security, to a home, to work, 5 5 to politi-
cal participation,' to education for adults, 157 and to co-determination in
factories. 58 Several of these rights are remnants of the old East German
concept of socialism, though the population and the politicians are slow
to admit that the advantages from these rights are non-existent. 15 For
instance, the right of political participation is ill-defined and superflu-
ous,'6 0 and the general right to social security is already included in the
Sozialstaatsprinzip, the principle of social justice.1"' The right to co-de-
termination is forwarded by the Social Democratic Party on a federal
clude the legislature from the principle of equality. The same equivocal definition is found
in Brandenburg draft constitution article 13. The Round Table draft article 2 had replaced
law, Gesetz, by public authority, offentliche Gewalt.
151. For example, the right to privacy, allgemeines Persiinlichkeitsrecht, developed
from Basic Law arts. 1 and 2. Judgment of June 3, 1980 54 BVerfGE 148, 153, 208, 217;
Judgment of Feb. 8, 1983 63 BVerfGE 131, 142. The extent of this right is difficult to phrase
in an article. Part of the right to privacy, the unwritten right to one's own papers, Recht auf
informationelle Selbstbestimmung, was developed in Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65
BVerfGE 1, and has been included in Brandenburg draft article 12 and Saxon draft article
32.
152. Rita and Frank Taubenfeld, Problems of Designing Stable Democracies, 24 INT'L
LAW. 689, 706, 707 (1990). The authors arrive at the curious conclusion that there is no right
to privacy in the Federal Republic, only the right to one's papers, even though both rights
are implied. Cf. 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 and 65 BVerfGE 1.
153. The Round-Table draft article 6(1) specifically provided for this right.
154. Whereas Basic Law article 8 extends the right to assemble only to Germans, Bran-
denburg draft article 24(1) and Saxon draft article 22 extend this right to everyone.
155. Brandenburg Draft Constitution arts. 45, 47 and 48.
156. Id., art. 22.
157. Id., art. 29. Article 36 even grants a right to vacations for professional, cultural or
political education for adults.
158. Id., art. 50.
159. For a description of the old communist attitude towards social rights as a tool to
combat capitalism and towards constitutions as a mere description of a transitional phase in
society, see Karl-Heinz Schonburg, Die grosse Furcht der Unternehmer vor sozialen
Rechten, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Dec. 17, 1991, at 5. In the Eastern states, 90% of the popula-
tion would like to have a right to a home, 83% a right to a place in kindergarten, 85% a
right to work. K6cher, supra note 66, at 5.
160. Such a right is included in the Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit, the general freedom
to act, which is a right interpreted into the Basic Law article 2(1). Judgment of Jan. 16,
1957, 6 BVerfGE 32, 36.
161. See generally Kunig, supra note 67, at 187-204.
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level,' 62 but the right is already included in federal statutory law to a
reduced degree. 6 3 The final Brandenburg constitution attenuated the
rigor of these rights by ambiguous wording that could be interpreted as
merely defining state aims."" The Saxon constitution attempts to accom-
modate similar demands from its electorate with western constitutional
doctrine by a slightly confused phrasing referring to some of these social
rights as political aims."6 5
Some of the social rights incorporated in the state constitutions in-
fringe on federal constitutional law and, therefore, must be considered
unconstitutional. For example, Brandenburg draft constitution article 51
prohibited the lockout of workers, a subject matter that is Federal con-
current legislation. 6 The final constitution does not contain lockout
provisions.
On the Federal level, demands for including social rights have resur-
faced in the constitutional committee.16 7 Brandenburg's Social Democrats
have retreated from rhetoric appealing to a population still imbued with
socialism, and they now lean toward opinions more consistent with West-
ern constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, the effects of their promises lin-
ger on. 6 s Those who support the inclusion of social rights in the constitu-
tion remain unimpressed by the economic effects of those rights and the
collapse of socialism." The state draft constitutions demonstrate that
some inclusion as political aims might be considered. However, this will
depend on whether the new Federal constitution will be subjected to a
public referendum. In that case, the doctrinal difference between political
aims and fundamental rights should be stressed in order to avoid a dilu-
tion of the normative force of the latter.1 70 In addition, the question
162. DAS GRUNDSATZPAPIER FOR DEN SPD VORSTAND, ZUR VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN
STAATES [ The Basic Paper of the Executive Board of the SPD, Regarding the Constitution
of a German State], reprinted in 26 RECHT UND POLITIK 207, 212 (1990) [hereinafter Basic
Papers of the SPD].
163. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, 50 BVerfGE 290.
164. See art. 45(1) (right to social security); art. 47(1) (right to a home); art. 48(1) (right
to work); art. 21(1) (right to political participation); art. 29(1) (right to education); art. 50
(right to co-determination).
165. For example, article 7 bears the title, "Decent Living Conditions as a Staatsziel,"
and recognizes the right to work, art. 7(1), and the right to a decent residence, art. 7(1), as
political aims.
166. Basic Law art. 74.
167. Gunter Bannas, Dem Verfassungsausschuss stehen zahe Beratungen bevor,
F.A.Z., Oct. 16, 1991, at 14.
168. Opinion of the Liberal Party, FDP, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 5.
169. Ninety percent in the East and sixty-six percent in the West favor a right to a
home; eighty-three percent in the East and sixty-six percent in the West favor a right to
kindergarten; eighty-five percent in the East and forty-nine percent in the West favor a
right to work. K6cher, supra note 66, at 5.
170. Basic Papers of the SPD, supra note 166, at 208. Inconsistent with this demand,
the Brandenburg constitution enumerates ambiguously worded articles under the heading
"2nd Main Chapter: Rights and Political Aims."
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whether the Basic Law should remain neutral on economic issues171 will
be resolved when social rights or the prohibition of lock outs are for-
warded again.17 1
Similarly the inclusion in the state constitutions of environmental
protections'7 3 will influence the shaping of the Federal constitution. In
addition, private interest groups like animal rights and ecological move-
ments have proposed to include such interests as "co-creationship" or the
"preservation of the natural resources of life" as political aims.' 74 As a
result, the constitutional committee no longer disputes inclusion of some
protection of the environment as a state aim in the Federal
constitution.
75
In addition, the new states' drafts reveal trends that will enrich the
discussion on the amendments of the Basic Law. The attention that the
state constitutions give to minorities and foreigners1 7 6 will probably result
in a change of standing for foreigners in the Basic Law as well.'17 Families
and children may also benefit from the attention given to them in the
state constitutions.'
7 8
Moreover, real or perceived shortcomings of the Basic Law will be
open to discussion again. For instance, the Basic Law's conditional prohi-
bition of private primary schools, 7 9 an "un-liberal" and "un-dogmatic"
171. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, 50 BVerfGE 290, 336; Hesse, supra note 67, at no. 22
(Das Grundgesetz liszt bestimmte Fragen, etwa solche der Wirtschaftsverfassung bewuszt
offen, um hier freier Auseinandersetzung und Gestaltung Raum zu lassen) [The Basic Law
leaves open certain questions, for example, that of constitutional guidelines for the econ-
omy, with the intention of enabling free discussion and modelling]; Volker Krning, Kern-
fragen der Verfassungsreform, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 161, 162 (1991).
172. Hartmut Kliemt, Im Wettlauf der Gruppenwiinsche, Die verletzlichen Chancen
ffir eine gute Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Demokratie, Das Grundgesetz der
Bundesrepublik hat sich bewahrt, F.A.Z., Feb. 1, 1992, at 15.
173. E.g. Brandenburg art. 39; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern draft art. 10; Saxony art. 10;
Saxony-Anhalt art. 35; Thuringia draft art. 19.
174. Tierschuitzer fordern "mitgeschdpfiichkeit als Staatsziel, F.A.Z., Feb. 26, 1992, at
1; Darnstiidt, supra note 82, at 90.
175. Bannas, supra note 167, at 14. All parties in the FRG now agree to include such a
political aim. BERLINER MORGENPOST, Nov. 17, 1991, at 4.
176. See e.g. Brandenburg draft art. 26 (Sorbs), art. 24 (the right to assemble applies to
foreigners as well), and art. 23 (might include foreigners, though unconstitutional under the
present Basic Law); Saxon draft art. 6, 6a (Sorbs and other minorities), art. 22 (the right to
assemble applies to foreigners as well). The Basic Law grants the right to assemble only to
German citizens, art. 8, and the right of foreigners to assemble is guaranteed by art. 2,
Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit, but can be limited by legislation.
177. At the same time, the very liberal right of asylum will probably be reduced. Sixty-
seven percent in the East and seventy-four percent in the West are in favor of such a reduc-
tion. Kbcher, supra note 66, at 5.
178. E.g. Brandenburg art. 27 (protection of marriage, family, unmarried hetero- or ho-
mosexual couples, and single parents), art. 28 (rights of children); Saxony art. 9 (protection
of children as a political aim). The Basic Law protects the institutions of marriage and
family, art. 6(1). Children are protected by arts. 1-19 but not specifically. Illegitimate chil-
dren have a right to equal treatment in accordance with art. 6(5).
179. Art. 7(5).
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remnant of anti-elitist thought after World War II, will be open for dis-
cussion. Although the state drafts decline to explicitly allow private pri-
mary schools, most treat private schools benevolently.8 0
Surprisingly, neither the state constitutions nor the constitutional
committee at the federal level attempt to reform or to reformulate the
ambiguous wording of the Basic Law.' 8'
4. Alternative Concepts of a Constitution: The Case of the State of
Brandenburg.'8 2
Brandenburg's draft constitution differed most from those of the
other states as well as from the present Basic Law. It revealed a different,
but interesting, concept of society, including proposals from the opposi-
tion parties at the Federal level. Brandenburg's draft constitution - and
many of the dissenting opinions in other state draft constitutions - ap-
peared to come close to violating federal law in order to put pressure on
the process of amending the Basic Law."8 3 This was, therefore, both a
constitutional and a political challenge.'84
The Brandenburg draft demonstrates the gradual transition from
communist constitutional doctrine to that of a modern, liberal democratic
society more than any other state constitution. Communist constitutional
doctrine perceives constitutions as a momentary description of the state
of progress of a society towards socialism.' 6 Such a constitution tends to
portray the relations between its citizens and towards the state more or
less truthfully' and puts little emphasis on fundamental rights.18 7 . The
Brandenburg draft heavily emphasized fundamental rights, but many of
its articles still tended to reorganize society as a whole and to educate its
citizens. For example, Brandenburg draft article 13(2) stated that every-
180. Anxious to invite private schools to oppose their state schools, which are still dom-
inated by the teachers of the old regime, Brandenburg and Saxony have given private
schools a right to be admitted.
181. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 362.
182. Brandenburg is governed by the Social Democratic Party and the Eastern Green
Party. As a result, it is the only Eastern state not ruled by the CDU or a coalition of the
CDU and the FDP. Its premier, Manfred Stolpe, SPD, has been accused of cooperating with
the former Secret Police, STASI, but so far has refused to step down. Rolf Soderlind, East
German Politician Faces New Stasi Allegations, Reuters, Feb. 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file. The oppositional CDU so far has not succeeded in plac-
ing a convincing opposition leader in Brandenburg. Lothar de Maiziere renounced his post
as party leader after similar allegations were made as against Stolpe. Id.
183. Land ohne Geheimdienst, 34 DER SPIEGEL 50, 50-53, Aug. 19, 1991; Professor Josef
Isensee, quoted in Sind neue Lnderverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992, at 4.
184. CDU Member of the Brandenburg Parliament Blechinger, quoted in Sind neue
Lnderverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992 at 4.
185. Schonburg, supra note 159, at 5.
186. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 152, at 706 n.28, at 707 n.30.
187. The fundamental rights contained in the Constitution of the German Democratic
Republic, although superficially impressive in number, were merely declarative and were not
enforceable as subjective rights.
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one owed everyone else recognition as equals, but the extent of this third-
party norm appeared questionable. 188 The adopted constitution did not
include this article. Another example of social organization is Constitu-
tion article 46, which imposes an affirmative duty upon everyone to de-
fend others from imminent attack, pursuant to the laws.' 9 Both of these
norms attempt to educate the Brandenburg citizens rather than to pro-
tect them against the state. In addition, the inclusion of various social
rights, such as the right to work, to a home, or to a place in kindergarten,
contributes to the idealistic, if not utopian, character of the constitution.
Burdening the constitution with policy formulations furthers the
misconception of the role of a constitution. To achieve the new social
norms, the Brandenburg draft exhorted political action. Article 9(2) as-
sured that the state would abolish criminal punishment for abortion dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy. Draft article 2(6) stated confusingly
that Brandenburg would assert its already existing rights in the federa-
tion.'9 0 Article 12(3) asserted that Brandenburg would not accept an in-
telligence service working against subversive activities as a reaction to the
formerly omnipotent and omnipresent Eastern secret service, Staats-
sicherheitsdienst, the Stasi.'9 Neither of these draft articles were
adopted into the final constitution.
Although the Brandenburg draft constitution was hailed as the most
progressive German constitution by some,' 92 it failed to distinguish suffi-
ciently between fundamental rights and political aims.'8 3 The lack of any
distinction between fundamental rights and political aims in the Bran-
denburg draft constitution further undermined its credibility. Oblivious
to economic and social conditions, the social rights may not have been
fulfilled. The disenchantment resulting from a constitution that makes
more promises than it can keep might be detrimental to fundamental
rights as well.
Furthermore, some norms in the draft constitution conflicted with
the present Basic Law and contributed to a lack of credibility because
188. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363; Christian Starck, Constitutional Definition and
Protection of Rights and Freedoms, in RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 19, 47 (Christian Starck ed. 1987).
189. According to the law, everyone must help out when there are accidents, catastro-
phes, and emergency hardships.
190. Critics have called it a comical article. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363.
191. Stephen Kinzer, Germans will see Stasi Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at A6;
Ralf Georg Reuth, Es wird manche uberraschungen geben, die Akteneinsicht in der Gauck-
Behorde, F.A.Z., Dec. 27, 1991, at 5.
192. Minister of Interior Ziel (SPD), quoted in, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991; Gustav Just
(SPD), Head of the Constitution Commission, quoted in, 34 DER SPIEGEL 50, Aug. 19, 1991.
193. The heading for Brandenburg draft articles 5-56 is "Fundamental Rights and Po-
litical Aims," with no further distinction regarding the character of each article. Saxony's
draft, to a lesser degree, suffers from the same confusion. For instance, it has different arti-
cle headings, but phrases fundamental rights and political aims in a confusingly similar
fashion. See e.g. arts. 7, 9.
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they may have been unenforceable. The provision in the Brandenburg
draft banning a secret service conflicted with the Basic Law because the
article violated the principle of the "defendant democracy."""4
The assurance of cultural autonomy for Sorbs 19 5 beyond state borders
is controversial at best and tarnishes the otherwise remarkable protection
of minorities in the constitution. 19' Also, the anti-nuclear and anti-mili-
tary stance" 7 conflicts with federal jurisdiction on this subject matter. It
should be added, however, that some constitutions in the western states,
introduced shortly after World War II, also contain social rights," '9 such
as the prohibition of lock outs, that have been interpreted by the courts
as having no force. Nevertheless, including daily politics and utopian
strategies in a constitution dilutes its normative force.
Finally, a constitution hindering the ability of a democratically
elected government to act will defray its credibility. The Saxon draft con-
stitution's dissenting opinions featured a number of institutions that
would have slowed or thwarted decision making. The citizens commis-
sioner, Biirgerbeauftragter, was supposed to represent the citizens against
the government. 9 If the government did not follow the recommendations
of the commissioner, a committee had to be formed to resolve the con-
flict.2 0 0 Similar types of commissioners have been envisaged to ensure
human rights, the protection of the environment, equal rights, and the
affairs of foreigners.2 ' These commissioners have been branded as parlia-
mentarian escapism or as rulers without a majority. 0 2 Even more prob-
194. The concept of a defendant democracy was introduced as a reaction against the
Weimar Constitution's neutral stand against its own enemies. The concept gives the Consti-
tutional Court, among others, the power to eliminate parties opposed to democracy. Basic
Law art. 21(2). In addition, basic rights can be forfeited. Basic Law art. 18. Ginther Dirig,
An Introduction to the Basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIc RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
THE BASIC LAW 11, 15-16 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988).
This article was taken out of the final draft of the constitution. Winters, supra note
144, at 4.
195. Brandenburg Constitution art, 25(2).
196. Saxon constitution art. 6(a) is similar but excludes the controversial language.
197. Article 39(9) states that Brandenburg will attempt not to accept nuclear arms on
its territory. Equally ripe for conflict was draft article 56, which stated that Brandenburg
would abolish lifelong confinement in prison and would grant participatory rights to in-
mates, a subject matter of federal jurisdiction. Brandenburg constitution article 54 no longer
contains such a provision.
198. Uwe Thaysen, Verfassungsrechtliches Licht im Osten?, DER TAGESSPIEGEL, May
27, 1992, at 7.
199. Art. 53 (Dissenting opinion of the Social Democratic Party).
200. Art. 53(a)(5).
201. Art. 53 (Dissenting opinion of the Green Party and the PDS).
202. Thaysen, supra note 199, at 7 (Dietrich Rauschning at the Hearings of the Saxon
parliament, June 15, 1991). However, similar types of commissioners exist in many states for
the protection of the right to one's own papers and for the protection of soldiers on the
federal level. Basic Law art. 45(b). These federal commissioners are justified by the diffi-
culty of the executive to control use the right of one's own papers against itself and with the
problematic position of soldiers when defending their rights against their superiors.
VOL. 21:1
CONSTITUTIONS AND REVOLUTIONS
lematic are committees formed to resolve conflicts in which the political
parties are not represented according to their strength.2 03 A senate-like
institution, representing communities, 20 4 would certainly slow down legis-
lation, as would a committee to assess the impact of new technologies on
nature and society.20 5 Although some of these institutions might help de-
- crease the growing alienation between the politicians and their electorate,
they may lead to a growing immobility of the parliament or to the rule of
a minority even more dangerous to the credibility of a democratic consti-
tution. Nevertheless, faced with the necessity to achieve a two-thirds ma-
jority for the constitution, Brandenburg's ruling politicians had to dress
down most of their controversial demands.06
V. CONCLUSION
The reunification of Germany has led to important changes in the
country as well as in the German Federal Constitution. Germany once
again had to pay a very high price for starting World War I, and its
constitution now reflects the end of this development. Contradictory ex-
pectations from Germany's neighbors regarding its participation in inter-
national military actions find their parallel in the constitutional debate
on such actions. At the same time, Germany prepares for further integra-
tion into the European Community.
With regard to internal politics, the controversies about the draft
constitutions of the five new states have shown a deep concern for attain-
ing a very high level of fundamental rights as well as a high level of social
rights. The former concern originates from a deep distrust of government
and is easily comprehensible in light of East Germany's recent history.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rest of the East European coun-
tries have shown far less concern and readiness to master their past
through constitutional safeguards. The concern about social security
shows a contradictory dependance on government by a population that
had been forced to renounce individualism and entrepreneurship.
On the federal level, these conflicting messages now have to be taken
into account when amending the Basic Law. The new amended German
Federal Constitution will stress the importance of preserving the environ-
ment, and of creating an economy with a strong sense of social justice and
perhaps with more elements of direct democracy. However, sudden or ab-
rupt changes in the German constitutional system will not occur because
a two-thirds majority is needed to pass any of the amendments." 7 Given
203. Art. 49(a)(2) (Dissenting opinion by the SPD, the Green Party and the PDS).
204. Art. 3(a) (Dissenting opinion of the Green Party; See Zum Landtagsentwurf der
Verfassung des Freistaates Sachsen, DIE GEMEINDEKAMMER, Dresden, June 18, 1991.
205. Art. 47(a) (Dissenting opinion of the SPD).
206. Sind neue Landerverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992 at 4; Beratungen
in Potsdam 0ber die Landesverassung ffir Brandenburg, F.A.Z., Mar. 3, 1992, at 4.
207. Basic Law art. 79(2); Andreas Thewalt, Schon jetzt Iisst der Wahikampf griissen,
BERLINER MORGENPOST, Nov. 17, 1991, at 4.
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the present distribution of power, the Christian Democrats and the Liber-
als in government are far from reaching such a majority with the Social
Democrats, the Green Party and the PDS. The conflicts over the new
Federal constitution have shown, however, that both sides are willing to
compromise. The integration of the Eastern and Western parts of Ger-
many will have to be achieved by reaching a common economic level. 208
Nevertheless, the debate over amendments to the Basic Law kindled by
the draft constitutions in the five new states will also have an integrating
effect on the reunited Germany.
208. Krbning, supra note 171, at 165.
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